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The study of legal history took an imperial turn some twenty
years ago. In a book review published in 2007, John Fabian Witt, a
leading historian of military law, remarked that “[o]ld-fashioned
empire” was “suddenly everywhere.” 1 Empire had been the subject of a
series of lengthy institutional studies, written around mid-century, that
described the formal legal structures of transnational enterprise and
government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 2 The new
studies that had caught Witt’s eye were nominally concerned with the
same subject. But there are also significant differences. The new studies
tended to rely on different sources: rather than acts of Parliament,
opinions of the courts at Westminster, and the charters, commissions,
*
Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York. This essay
is a response to Christian R. Burset, Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority, 74
VAND. L. REV. 621 (2021). I want to thank Professor Burset and editor Shivam Bhakta for the
invitation. I also want to thank Fred Konefsky for his helpful suggestions.
1.
John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the
Real British Empire Please Stand Up), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 754 (2007) (book review).
2.
For example, see JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & THOMAS RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664–1776) (1944);
LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL
SYSTEM BEFORE 1783 (1930). Here you might also fit the old casebooks in “Development of Legal
Institutions,” including JOSEPH H. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (1965); John Philip Dawson, The Development of Law and Legal Institutions (1968)
(unpublished manuscript). Professor Dawson’s unpublished manuscript became the basis for the
contemporary casebook by John Langbein, Renee Lerner, and Bruce Smith. JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS xxvi (2009).
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and orders of the Privy Council, the new studies focused on writings
produced by the individuals navigating frontier encounters, like orders,
letters, journals, and newspaper items. The analytic framework was
different: the old construct of a “first British empire” gave way to
multiple imperial projects, intersecting with diverse populations of
settlers and enslaved or indigenous peoples, each with their own
purposes. The voice and narration were different: in contrast to the
disembodied character of the old-fashioned studies, the new accounts
were granular, dynamic, and more revealing of human experience and
activity in administration. Looking back now, twenty years out, it
seems right to conclude that this change in approach was fruitful,
producing a deeper understanding of colonialism, the imperial crisis
and American Revolution, and the projects of constitution-making and
western expansion that followed. 3
But though legal history took an imperial turn, many other
areas of legal scholarship did not. For some subjects this seems
appropriate; for others it is surprising. For instance, although the
literature of constitutional law has long been historical, 4 much of it
remains domestic on principle and stubbornly institutional. A glance at
the leading law reviews suggests that most legal scholarship is
doctrinal—a form of history—but without much attention to the
significance of these boundaries to the study.
The effect has been to open a gap between historical scholarship
and cognate studies in the law. For example, the nature of the federal
judicial function is a topic with significant historical content, touching
on some of the same subject matter as our new imperial legal histories;
yet the perspective remains essentially national, framing the federal
courts as a response to concerns with national revenue, debt, and
matters of foreign policy like the enforcement of treaties, jurisdiction
over aliens, and captures at sea. As Professor Burset explains, some
aspects of the topic, like the ban on advisory opinions, are understood
in exclusively domestic terms (with a compulsory nod to relevant

3.
Major contributions to this line include LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES:
LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900 (2002); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD,
1664–1830 (2005); MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); LISA FORD, SETTLER
SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836
(2010); JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011);
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006).
4.
G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV.
485, 487 (2002).
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English precedents). 5 This may be because the leading casebook in the
field, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts & The Federal System,
first published in 1953, was framed in response to a concern with the
effect of modern federal jurisdiction on domestic divisions of power,
principally between federal and state courts, and between Congress and
the federal judiciary—a framing that subsequent editions of the book
have largely retained. 6 While there have been many contributions to
the scholarly study of federal judicial power since Hart and Wechsler
was first published, the giants of the field still hold a kind of magnetic
power over its line of development.
To pull the study of advisory opinions off this course would
require a contribution of considerable mass. Although it is now rare, a
new source might do the trick, and this is what Professor Burset
promises us here. He has made a study of the archival and published
papers of judges in late-eighteenth century British-governed Bengal. 7
What relevance could they have to the power of federal judges? As
Professor Burset interprets them, those papers reveal British Bengali
judges wrestling with the same concerns that led to the abandonment
of advisory opinions in England and America. If judges in all three
common-law jurisdictions decided to abandon advisory opinions around
the same time, then their abandonment was “a global phenomenon that
requires a transnational explanation.” 8 Perhaps most strikingly, the
transnational explanation that Professor Burset offers is an intellectual
one. The reason that judges across the common-law world abandoned
advisory opinions was because of a breakdown in the “jurisprudential
orthodoxy” that had treated judicial opinions as declarations of existing
law. 9 This breakdown led to an examination of what made statements
of the law authoritative. Whether judicial advice should enjoy the same
authority and status as opinions in litigated cases was unclear and
disputed. In this intellectual context, Professor Burset argues, judges
were unwilling to give advisory opinions for fear of how they might
be used.
The article is significant for the archival work alone. It is useful,
as well, for the impressive synthesis of the existing secondary
literature, collected in the footnotes, which makes a convenient reading
5.
See Burset, supra note *, at 623.
6.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 957, 962 (1994); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 889 (1974) (book review).
7.
See Burset, supra note *, at 643–50.
8.
Id., at 623.
9.
Id., at 623, 659–60.
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list for us mere mortals. The argument of the article is ambitious. As
the Table of Contents suggests, its structure is complex: the author asks
us to visit three different jurisdictions (two British and one American,
each thousands of miles apart), in three different decades, in three
different political and social contexts, with three different institutional
frameworks. The author moves the reader discontinuously through
time, interpreting each context both for its meaning to the historical
actors embedded within it, and for its significance to contemporary
constitutional law.
I want to use this Response to explore some of the complexities
of this argument. I’d like to ask: What does it mean to give a
“transnational” explanation? Is one actually necessary here, as the
author avers? What place does the “local” have in such an explanation?
Does a transnational explanation of the formal abandonment of
advisory opinions actually rule out local factors and contributing
causes—or does it, in fact, require them? What does it mean to give a
transnational intellectual explanation—to explain the decline of
advisory opinions by reference to an anxiety about their authoritative
status? Intellectual causation is somewhat uncommon in contemporary
legal history, which prefers to emphasize the “contingency” of legal
ideas and institutions by attributing their adoption to material selfinterest or to the complex calculations that track the distribution of
power in modern political societies. And what is the connection, exactly,
between Justice Elijah Impey of the Supreme Court of Judicature in
Bengal and Justice John Jay of the United States Supreme Court? Does
their saying the same words, or expressing the same anxieties, mean
they were moved by the same “idea,” even if the men never actually
communicated? 10 What about the fact that they acted in different
political, social, cultural, and institutional contexts?
These are not just questions for Professor Burset. They are
questions for fellow-travelers on our twenty-year imperial journey. The
new studies of empire often focus on individuals at the periphery. Are
these studies of empire, or of those individuals? If we think of the
empire as a formal structure of institutions and laws, precisely what
does a study of its settlers and magistrates tell us about that structure?
Do the formal structures of institutions and laws contribute anything
to how those individuals experience the world around them and act on

10. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING
& CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 29, 54–56 (James Tully ed., 1988).
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it? Does form contribute to experience? (This is a perspective I have tried
to explore in my own work on colonial Virginia. 11)
In what follows, I won’t try to answer these abstract questions
themselves. Rather, I will sketch some of what I take to be the relevant
history for understanding the abandonment of advisory opinions, but
which is not part of Professor Burset’s account. By adducing this
material, my aim is to raise the larger questions by implication, and to
get a sense, thereby, of the boundaries of Professor Burset’s argument,
and of the terms on which we might refine and incorporate it into our
understanding of the nature of the federal judicial power.
I. ANXIETY ABOUT THE NATURE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
It is now commonplace to observe that in the eighteenth century,
judges were thought to have a purely declaratory function. They
declared what the law was (jus dicere), rather than giving it (jus dare),
or making it, as we say today when we speak of “judge-made law.”
Blackstone included this declaratory theory in his Commentaries,
observing that the judge “is only to declare and pronounce, not to make
or new-model, the law.” 12 Why it should have been thought important
to insist on this point is generally less discussed. This was not a theory
of absolute stasis in the law, though it is sometimes described that way.
Blackstone did not insist on the fiction that the common law had
remained unchanged “since time immemorial,” as had Edward Coke in
the seventeenth century; indeed, Blackstone argued, adaptation
constituted the chief advantage of the common law over statutory law. 13
Many commentators regarded the mass of statutory law then being
enacted by Parliament as confused, contradictory, oppressive, and
inconsistent with English liberty. In contrast, the common law was the
repository of English liberty, even though it had changed over time to
meet new social problems. The point of the declaratory theory was to
clarify the role of judges in the maintenance of English liberty. Judges
11. Matthew Steilen, The Legislature at War: Bandits, Runaways and the Emergence of a
Virginia Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 493 (2019).
12. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK III: OF PRIVATE
WRONGS 216 (Thomas P. Gallanis & Wilfrid Prest eds., 2016) (1768) (emphasis omitted).
13. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 72–73 (1989). Probably the best known expression of this view in
the Commentaries is Blackstone’s image of the common law as a “Gothic castle, erected in the days
of chivalry, but fitted up for a modern inhabitant.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 178. For Coke’s
view that the common law had remained unchanged since time immemorial, see J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT 35–41 (1987); Gerald J. Postema,
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWWEALTH L.J. 155, 169–70
(2002).
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were to declare existing legal principles and then apply them
reasonably to the situation at hand. They could do this because the
principles were relatively determinate at any one point of time. Rarely
did judges alter the principles themselves. Rather, they were changed
insensibly, over time, simply by application. This made legal change
reasonably predictable; as defenders often put it, the common law was
“certain,” rather than arbitrary, and because it was certain, it preserved
liberty. 14 The connection between the common law and English liberty
was often repeated and became a motif in the eighteenth-century
political rhetoric of conservative Whigs and Tories.
This perspective placed a tremendous amount of pressure on
describing judicial decisionmaking in an accurate way. Did English
judges actually preserve the certainty of the law by using reason to
adapt it to emerging social problems? Professor Burset tells us that
something of a crisis affected the common law in the mid-eighteenth
century, and suggests several possible causes. 15 I suspect the precise
source of the crisis is important to his account. If the declaratory theory
crumbled under its own intellectual weight, because its account of the
law began to appear doubtful, then we make way for an intellectual
explanation of the judicial abandonment of advisory opinions of the
transnational form he wants to offer. On the other hand, perhaps the
ultimate cause wasn’t intellectual, but grew out of the social conditions
in which judges were educated and worked. In that case, we might
expect a local explanation to be necessary—assuming English,
American, and Bengali judges did not share these conditions. Or, as I
think most likely, we may need to invoke both transnational and local
explanations to account for the decline of advisory opinions.
The declaratory theory of judging is usually introduced as a foil,
and this is largely because modern readers have trouble understanding
how one could ever find such a view persuasive as an actual account of
the judicial office. The polarization, violence, and decline of civil society
that America and Europe are presently experiencing make this
difficulty more acute. We are evidently missing something that common
lawyers of the past had, which made the declaratory theory feasible as
a theoretical solution to their concerns. The “certainty” of the common
law required the existence of a set of attitudes and values shared among
the members of the bench and bar whose activities maintained the law.
Those shared attitudes and values were born, at least in part, out of a
14. Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1553,
1558 (2009).
15. Burset, supra note *, at 660–61.
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process of acculturation and socialization that had long been part of
English legal education at the Inns of Court. Common lawyers referred
to the professional opinion produced by this process as “common
erudition” or “common learning.” 16 Their shared outlook was born, as
well, out of a common economic and social status as gentlemen. These
social forces generated a frame of mind that made “certainty” possible
within the institutions where the common law was declared. As the
English legal historian and theorist Brian Simpson put it, reflecting on
the history of the common law, it is within “a tightly cohesive group,”
possessing “a wide measure of consensus upon basic ideas and values,”
that it becomes possible for “[a]rgument and discussion” to “commonly
produce agreement in the end.” 17 Without them, “[t]here is no a priori
reason for supposing . . . there is a rational way of resolving disputes.” 18
By the time we reach the period under study in Professor
Burset’s article, these constitutive social forces had weakened severely,
and in some cases even lapsed. The Inns of Court began to decline in
the late seventeenth century and essentially served no educational
function at all by the middle of the eighteenth century. Efforts to create
an institutional substitute at the English universities, such as the
famous Vinerian chair at Oxford, which Blackstone occupied, were
ultimately unsuccessful. 19 It was recommended to young gentlemen
that they spend a few years at university studying the liberal arts, and
future lawyers socialized there or in pubs or university clubs. But for
much of the eighteenth century, English legal education effectively
lacked an institutional form. Aspiring gentlemen lawyers were left to
educate themselves by reading ponderous abridgements, treatises, or
other works of legal literature, and perhaps by apprenticing in the office
of a lawyer, where they were likely to be busied with mechanical tasks.
What was needed now was a substitute for the shared attitudes
and values that had made it possible to reach consensus about the law
using lawyerly methods. What was needed was a boundary constraint,
though of course no one described it in those terms: a test, an authority,
a rule or maybe a procedure, for settling with certainty what the law
was. We begin to see lawyers commonly citing legal writings, and
especially judicial opinions, in support of their descriptions of the law.
16. J.H. BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 67–69 (2001) (describing common learning as including “a body of received wisdom about
how questions can be framed and what kinds of answers are permissible or likely to find
acceptance”).
17. A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359, 380 (1987).
18. Id.
19. DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 113–31 (2000).
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Judicial opinions long possessed an authoritative status, but they had
been subsumed into the fabric of common learning by the social practice
of readings at the Inns and oral deliberations conducted by the bar; now
they were to stand on their own. 20 As a result, legal opinions themselves
changed. They began to include more lengthy written expositions of the
law, purporting to show how a decision followed from, or fit alongside,
an existing corpus of authority. 21 The “office of judgment” held by the
judge very quickly came to seem inseparable from the exposition he
offered in deciding a case or announcing a principle, and writers
captured this sense by defining “judicial power” as a power to “expound”
the law. 22
The increased importance of legal writings also carried in its
wake a concern with establishing authoritative sources of the law.
Which legal writings would count? 23 Of course, if there were no
agreement about which sources should be authoritative, sources would
be unable to’ play the constraining role they were needed to play—the
essence of Jeremy Bentham’s criticism, quoted by Professor Burset. 24
Relatedly, since the words of a legal writing mattered more, the
authenticity of that writing emerged as an important measure of
authority. It became important to know, for instance, whether quoted
language had in fact used by the judge or by learned counsel. The
construction of the legal archive became a matter of more than
antiquarian and constitutional concern, but an integral feature of
English law and legal practice. 25
Another feature of these developments is the increase,
commonly observed, in the authority attributed to judicial precedent,
and to the concomitant rise of a doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis
required the judge to follow a governing decision even if convinced that
it should not be followed in the present case for some other reason. 26
Such a doctrine increased the certainty of the law and drew the support
of the common law’s most vocal critics, like Bentham. Of course, the
degree of constraint provided would depend on what it meant for a
previous decision to govern a present case; if “govern” were interpreted
narrowly, even a doctrine of stare decisis would provide little constraint
on judicial discretion. Advocates of a declaratory theory, like
Blackstone, who wanted to render the law “certain” and protective of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Burset, supra note *, at 663.
BAKER, supra note 16, at 78, 81, 85.
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 219–20, 226, 239 (2008).
SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 380.
See Burset, supra note *, at 661–62.
Paul Halliday, Authority in the Archives, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF L. 110, 112–14 (2014).
GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 187–88 (2d ed. 2019).
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liberty, sought to stitch decisions together into a system, whose
principles would then deductively constrain subsequent judicial
decisions. In the terminology of the period, this was to treat the law as
a “science.” 27 The work of fabricating a uniform legal doctrine out of a
series of cases became the task of judicial exposition as well as that of
legal writers producing institutes and similar legal treatises. 28 As
Professor Burset describes, it was Mansfield more than any other
English judge who was associated with the project of identifying such
principles, although the differences between his views and Blackstone’s
could be subtle. 29
The question posed regarding advisory opinions, it seems, was
this: Were they the sort of legal writing that should have authoritative
status as a source of law, consistent with the demand that the law be
sufficiently certain to preserve English liberty? This is an intellectual
question, but it grew out of social changes that had an effect on English
law and legal institutions, namely, the decline of association and
education of English lawyers. Throughout the period under study, the
question could still be answered in different ways; several ways of
thinking about advisory opinions were possible within the social and
intellectual framework. The attitudes of leading English jurists toward
advisory opinions, canvassed by Professor Burset in his article, nicely
show this ambivalence—both the attraction and the sense of risk—and
the continuing viability of advisory opinions despite the
pronouncements of Sackville’s Case. 30 If I am right about this, then we
should concede that anxiety about the common law was likely not a
sufficient cause of the transnational abandonment of advisory opinions.
Rather, it was at most a necessary cause: it laid the foundation for
political disputes to take on constitutional content by drawing on the
widespread intellectual anxiety about the certainty of the law. It seems
to me that there are two geographic sources of causation operating: one
transnational, which follows the English common law to its colonies,
and one local, attached to colonial institutions and to the politics that
affected those institutions.

27. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES 12, 20–21 (1941); Kadens, supra note 14, at 1559, 1580; Barbara J. Shapiro, Law
and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 728–29, 755 (1969).
28. MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, 1760–1850 19, 27,
34 (1991); A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 273, 280–82 (1987); BAKER, supra note 16, at 77–78.
29. Burset, supra note *, at 661.
30. See id., at 642–43, 664–66.
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II. THE IMPERIAL SHADOW OF ENGLISH ANXIETY ABOUT THE LAW
Let us briefly consider the case of American law. Professor
Burset explores views of advisory opinions in the United States circa
1790, but this is decades after their abandonment in England and some
years after the events he describes in British Bengal. What of colonial
British North America in the mid-eighteenth century? Did lawyers in
Britain’s North American colonies experience the same intellectual
anxieties about the common law? Does the available evidence suggest
that their anxieties had a similar source in the socialization and
training of American lawyers?
There are some important distinctions to be made here. A
number of historians have described a persistent or recurrent strain of
utopian anti-lawyerism in American society and politics. 31 In early
Massachusetts, Virginia, and elsewhere, lawyers were banned from
court, and their numbers remained strikingly small in every colony
(sometimes in the single digits) through the end of the seventeenth
century. By the second third of the eighteenth century, however,
common lawyers in several colonies had gained a foothold, both for their
profession and for their body of law. The continent’s first bar association
opened in 1709 in New York City, which soon became a leading urban
center for the practice of law. 32 A handful of New York lawyers attended
one of the Inns of Court, but most were trained as apprentices or
“clerks” in a local law office. 33 This was the dominant practice in all the
colonies, excepting, to some degree, South Carolina and Virginia. In
Virginia, a pretension to gentlemanly status among the planter class
led to a significant number of bookish young men being dispatched to
London to claim the Inn credential, but most did not practice as
lawyers. 34 The five Justices who signed the Correspondence renouncing
advisory opinions provide a sample of the various paths open in the
middle of the eighteenth century: John Jay, William Paterson, and
James Wilson completed some university studies and then clerked in
the office of an American attorney; John Blair, of Virginia, attended
Middle Temple, one of the English Inns of Court; and James Iredell
received no formal education at all, but read for the bar in a law office.

31. E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94–102 (2d ed. 1985).
32. 4 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE, 1735–1776, at 11 (2018).
33. PAUL M. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 18–21 (1939).
34. 3 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND
NEW ENGLAND, 1660–1750, at 47–50 (2016).
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Jay and Blair hailed from aristocratic families, but the others did not. 35
By the time of their appointment to the Supreme Court, they all could
claim some distinction in public life, but none was the product of a
system of legal education anything like what had existed at the Inns
and the courts of Westminster before the English Civil War. In America,
as in England, there was simply no formal institution for socializing
and training that might supply the habits of mind that had long afforced
the common law.
Nevertheless, as the example suggests, throughout the North
American colonies the law attracted the same stirp of ambitious
gentlemen who elected the profession in England. Many of these young
men sought not just wealth, but influence and honor, and they
congregated with one another to that end in a variety of informal
associations, such as law and debating societies, like the “Moot” of the
City of New York, where, in 1770, one could find John Jay, alongside
other leading men, like William Livingston, Gouverneur Morris, and
James Duane. 36 Apprenticeship in the law office of an important local
leader could serve the same acculturating function, as appears to have
been the case under the reputable George Wythe in Virginia. 37 Some
young men also took a course of studies in the liberal arts, hoping to
refine themselves, but there seems to have been less agreement in the
colonies than in England about the utility of university study for a law
career. 38 Candidates for the bar were usually left to read and
“commonplace” (compile excerpts) from law books in private collections
or an academic library, and even among the ambitious, this might mean
a wide range of things. John Adams made himself into a scholar; Patrick
Henry, in contrast, famously claimed to have prepared for his
examination by devoting a single month to reading Coke’s Institutes and
a collection of Virginia’s laws. 39 The need to self-educate was one reason
why access to libraries was so important for American lawyers.
35. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 56–65 (1995).
36. HAMLIN, supra note 33, at 96–97, 201–03.
37. See Alan McKinley Smith, Virginia Lawyers, 1680-1776: The Birth of a Profession, 43
(1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).
38. For example, a letter from Henry Tucker to his son, the future Virginia jurist, St. George
Tucker, asks why he has enrolled in classes in philosophy and mathematics, which were part of
“an Academical Education” but of no use in practicing law. Id. at 39–40 (quoting Letter from Henry
Tucker to St. George Tucker (Apr. 10, 1772)). Henry was concerned about the cost of his son’s
university education. On the other hand, the Inns of Court were also expensive, and they provided
no education at all. HAMLIN, supra note 33, at 21–22, 115–16.
39. On education by reading and commonplacing, see, e.g., JEFFERSON’S LEGAL
COMMONPLACE BOOK, 1–3, 6 (David Thomas Konig & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2019); Steilen, supra
note 11, at 520–26 (describing the legal education of Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry). Cf. H.
TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
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Perhaps more than in England, the American evidence suggests
the existence of an important social distance between the young,
college-educated, aspiring lawyer-statesmen and the lawmakers who
sat in provincial assemblies and on juries and even the judicial bench. 40
In Virginia these social divisions matured over the last quarter of the
eighteenth century into partisan political controversies about the
structure of the state’s legal system and the practice of law. The rhetoric
of these controversies shared much in common with coeval English
rhetoric about lawyers and liberty; thus, for example, an eminent
Virginia planter and slave-owner, Landon Carter, dismissed what he
called the “mechanical“ knowledge of professional lawyers, whose
training had prepared them only for “knowing from whom to Copy
Properly”—a reference to the forms and manuals that were popular in
legal practice. 41 (The justices of the peace, for their part, were often
criticized for failing to observe established legal forms in their papers
and proceedings.) But the opposite of “mechanical” knowledge—
lawyerly discretion—also caused anxiety, and in Virginia it triggered a
defensive embrace of the local office of justice of the peace, usually filled
by planters, rather than a centralized court system dominated by the
educated legal elite practicing in Williamsburg. Supporters of the
justices defended their wide jurisdiction and the insulation of their
judgments from effective appellate review by invoking the language of
radical English “country” politics, arguing that they protected liberty
and staved off the corruption of centralized power. 42
These political disputes can be connected with theoretical claims
about the law much like those we observed in England. In responding
to their country critics, lawyers made use of the same ideas to
emphasize the narrowness of judicial discretion and the certainty of the
law. They embraced the familiar declaratory theory: that the task of the
judge was merely to identify and declare legal principles, not to make
or alter those principles. 43 They sought to craft their opinions in a
“deductivist” style—that is, to convey an impression that legal
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 9–20 (1965) (describing the importance of libraries for ideas and
politics in colonial America).
40. LEMMINGS, supra note 19, at 242–44; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 3, at 127–28. Studies of
this division in individual colonies include the aforementioned Hulsebosch; JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 4–9 (2004); Smith,
supra note 37, at 8–10.
41. THE DIARY OF COLONEL LANDON CARTER OF SABINE HALL, 1752-1778, at 93 (Jack P.
Greene ed., 1987). In England, we also find criticisms of legal education as being “mechanical” and
lawyers “illiterate.” LEMMINGS, supra note 19, at 115, 145.
42. The classic study is A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS:
CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 32–72, 112–59 (1981).
43. G. EDWARD WHITE WITH GERALD GUNTHER, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 195–96 (1988).
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principles deductively compelled a particular answer, and thus
constrained judicial discretion. Perhaps the most successful
practitioner of this method (ever) was a young Virginia lawyer named
John Marshall. 44 The attraction of deductivism to American lawyers
may explain why, as historians have observed, Blackstone’s
Commentaries was more popular in the United States than in England,
where it invited significant criticism. 45 In America, an edition of
Blackstone edited by the Virginia jurist, St. George Tucker, was an
immediate success and held its place as the preeminent learned
American lawbook for nearly twenty years. 46
Tucker contributed, as well, to solving another of the problems
faced by American jurists in this period, which was the dearth of
properly “republican” legal authorities. The principles in Blackstone’s
Commentaries were not consistent with republican government
because they had not been adopted with consent. 47 Tucker, Marshall,
and other lawyers began to create case reports, raw materials for a
republican common law, and by the early nineteenth century we can
observe the emergence of a judicial practice of accumulating precedents
in a lengthy written opinion, much like Blackstone had done on the
English bench. Judge Tucker developed this art to such a degree that
an alienated colleague on Virginia’s General Court, Spencer Roane,
finally ripped one of Tucker’s opinions from his hands as he was reading
it at conference and threw it on the floor, declaring that he refused to
hear another of his “long, tedious, and ridiculous” opinions.” 48 Other
treatises written in the institute style joined Tucker’s Blackstone,
including the Commentaries on American Law of the great New York
judge, James Kent. 49 This style of legal literature supported a view of
the law as a system of principles, from which results in a case would
determinately flow.
44. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW
32–35 (1996).
45. On English criticisms of Blackstone, see LOBBAN, supra note 28, at 47–50, 56–61 (arguing
that Blackstone was “lazy and inept as a researcher, and that he did not go deeply enough into the
history of the ancient laws to explain the modern law”).
46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH
NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA xiii (Paul Finkelman & David Cobin
eds., 1996) (1803).
47. KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900, at
104–05 (2011).
48. Matthew Steilen, A Virginia Perspective on McCulloch 23–26 (Nov. 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER’S LAW REPORTS AND SELECTED PAPERS,
1782–1825, at 89–90, 101 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2013). On Judge Blackstone’s habit of “lining
up . . . authorities,” see Kadens, supra note 14, at 1585.
49. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. (1993).

138

VAND. L. REV. EN BANC

[2021

A full picture of these developments would require much more
than the quick sketch I have given here. But we have enough, I think,
to suggest the operative question for Professor Burset’s account of the
British colony of Bengal: were its judges operating under social and
political pressures like those in England and America? If so, did they
induce writers to emphasize restrictions on judicial discretion? Was
there a need, grounded in the same concerns, to identify authoritative
sources of law? Or, on the other hand, were the actions and writings of
officials in British Bengal guided by a different set of concerns, unique
to that colony?
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL ANXIETY AND
ITS CONNECTION TO LOCAL POLITICS
By the time of the Correspondence of the Justices, in 1793,
advisory opinions had been in question in America for some time. 50 If
the absence of an institutional seat for lawyerly acculturation,
association, and training led to an anxiety about judicial discretion and
the authoritative status of advisory opinions, as I have suggested, then
these causes seem to have been at work both in metropolitan England
and its North American colonial periphery. Although it is complex, I do
think we can call this a transnational explanation. But if we want to
understand the relatively late timing of the formal abandonment of
advisory opinions in America, it seems right to consider another factor
as well: institutions.
Let us start in an “old-fashioned” way, with a formal description.
There was general agreement at the Constitutional Convention on the
need for a national judicial power; on its vesting in a single, supreme,
national court; on the court’s possession of a jurisdiction sufficient to
vindicate national interests; and the need for the judges of that court to
be independent by tenure and salary. 51 The system of federal judges,
federal courts, and federal jurisdiction constituted by Article III and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 largely reflects this scope of agreement. 52
Although there was as of yet no general grant of what we know as
“federal question jurisdiction,” the Act established a jurisdiction over
civil enforcement actions and a system of federal district courts in which
those actions might be brought, by federal attorneys, before federal
judges. There was an appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to
50. See Burset, supra note *, at 651.
51. This is a conventional view of the framing of the federal judicial power. See, e.g., RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch.
1 (7th ed. 2015).
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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protect the Constitution and federal treaties from encroachment in
state courts. An apparatus for the vigorous enforcement of federal law
had been erected. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Judicature (SCJ)
at Fort William, Bengal, had a different formal structure. Its judges
were not independent in the same way; they held their seats at the
pleasure of the Crown and, it seems, might be removed by legislative
address—a power expressly rejected by the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention. 53 The SCJ’s jurisdiction was narrower than
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, being largely confined to
employees of the British East India Company and to those Bengalis who
accepted it. What relevance do these formal, institutional differences
have for interpreting the statements of judges who sat on the respective
courts? They provide a framework for interpreting their statements,
since it seems likely the formal structure of their courts influenced
judges’ perception of institutional purposes and risks.
We should also consider the resources available to these
institutions, including people—that is, staff or personnel—since this
can have a profound effect on the scope and development of institutional
authority and the legal doctrines that describe it. Thus, it is sometimes
observed that during the Confederation and Federalist periods of
American history, there were few men qualified to give legal advice on
delicate questions of state. As a result, perhaps, many elite lawyers and
judges were recruited to serve in foreign-affairs roles. 54 Once in this
station, the men acquired further institutional expertise, increasing the
state’s dependence on them. In this way, the small number of elite
Americans trusted to conduct foreign affairs reinforced the traditional
English practice of advisory opinions that Professor Burset describes. 55
It is also often observed that there was a general blurring of
institutional boundaries between the great departments of the national
government. This was related to personnel, but it was not just a matter
of failing to separate persons; it also reflected the existence of
conceptions, quite different from our own, of the proper powers of the
departments of government. 56 Most relevant here, early Americans
53. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428–29 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). My understanding of the tenure of judges who sat on the SCJ is based on correspondence
with Professor Burset. On recall by address, see ELIJAH BARWELL IMPEY, MEMOIRS OF SIR ELIJAH
IMPEY 270 (1857).
54. STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 95
(1997).
55. See Burset, supra note *, at 631–37 (describing advice-giving under the classical common
law).
56. Id. at 52; see generally William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers
in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1989) (describing the lack of clarity and
agreement surrounding the separation of powers doctrine).
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seem to have conceived of their “independent” judicial power without
the great emphasis we place today on the doctrine of justiciability. Here
we should mention the practice by early Supreme Court justices of
giving partisan jury charges, which passed beyond the case at hand and
well into the realm of political speech; as well as the justices’ efforts to
reinforce a tottering federal government by playing what the historian
Ralph Lerner called “Republican Schoolmaster” to the multitudes
gathered for a session of court. 57 Though they persisted for some time,
these activities were losing ground in the last decades of the eighteenth
century. In our other jurisdictions, England and Bengal, we can also see
inklings of a doctrine of ripeness, finality, and something like a
principle of constitutional avoidance—notions that appear to have been
imperfectly distinguished from the discomfort with advisory opinions. 58
Reviewing the evidence gives one the sense of witnessing the birth of a
doctrine, whose precise contours were yet those of contemporary
justiciability, but which was bound up quite closely with the
institutional development of the judiciary. As the doctrine matured, the
institutional range of judicial power simultaneously narrowed
and firmed.
The emerging desire to constrain the judicial office to the
adjudication of litigated cases could have surprising effects, some of
which may complicate Professor Burset’s account. Thus, according to a
conventional understanding of the development of judicial review,
conservative legal elites pushed for a judicial power to refuse to give
effect to legislation as a means of curbing state assemblies under the
influence of popular faction. 59 Delegates at the Constitutional
Convention were quite anxious to preserve this power against
accusations of bias, such as might be invited if judges participated in
the veto power by sitting on a “Council of Revision.” 60 Judges injected
into the political process of making law would be unable to exercise
impartially their office of “expounding” the law when it came before
57. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S. CT. REV. 127
(1967); see also Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 S. CT.
REV. 123, 125–31 (1973) (describing disagreements over the bounds of judges’ powers).
58. For ripeness, see Kadens, supra note 14, at 1582–85 (describing several cases in which
judges refused to join decisions for fear of judicial overreach). Doctrines of finality and
constitutional avoidance are suggested by Professor Burset’s discussion of Bengal. Burset, supra
note*, at 26, 28. Constitutional avoidance is not usually thought of as a justiciability doctrine, but
it can be compared to the Bickelian interpretation of political question doctrine, that is, as a
prudential refusal to answer a question of law presented in a case.
59. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 54–64 (2004) (describing the origins of judicial review and its justifications).
60. E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 108–09 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (statement of Mr. King); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
53, at 79 (statement of Mr. Ghorum).
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them in a case, which implied a power of judicial review. 61 The irony,
however, is that the power of judicial review ended up repeatedly
injecting federal judges into matters of acute political controversy. If
judges declined to give advisory opinions because they feared their
partisan misuse, as Professor Burset argues, why would the same
judges continue to strike down laws in the face of vitriolic partisan
responses, such as were engendered in cases like McCulloch v.
Maryland? 62 Justice Marshall had to work over a number of years to
fully establish an institutional power in the Court to review
congressional statutes and presidential acts. 63 He had no greater
control over the use and reception of his judicial opinions than he did
over extrajudicial statements; and the Court’s authority to issue
judgments expanding national power and narrowing or invalidating
state power was repeatedly challenged. Perhaps we should say that an
institution itself can acquire developmental momentum, a selfunderstanding and ethos, and that this momentum can carry its
occupants on a trajectory they might otherwise not have elected, for fear
of the political risk.
It seems clear that the relationship of an intellectual anxiety
about the authority of law, institutional form, politics, and legal
doctrine could be extremely complex, and might involve overlapping,
reinforcing, or conflicting imperial and local strands. If we turn to
Professor Burset’s reconstruction of events in British-governed Bengal
in the decades after the Regulating Act, I find it tempting to see
multiple connections between local politics, institutional form, and an
emerging doctrine of justiciability. The SCJ authorized by the
Regulating Act and chartered by the Crown was intended to curb the
power of the British East India Company (Company), which had grown
so mighty that it mimicked an imperial power. 64 To serve that end,
British legislators thought it vital that the Court maintain its
independence from company power. When Justice Impey, whose
correspondence forms the basis of Professor Burset’s account, accepted
a second judgeship with a company court, members of the House of
Commons were angered, and resolved that he be made to “answer the
charge of having accepted an office granted by, and tenable at, the
61. Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 479, 555–58, 561–63 (2014); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS,
1787-1984, at 561 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
62. JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1–21 (GERALD GUNTHER ed.,
1969).
63. Mark Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall
Court, 51 POL. RSCH. Q. 221, 224 (1998).
64. BENTON, supra note 3, at 135–36.
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pleasure of the servants of the East India Company, which has a
tendency to create a dependence in the said Supreme Court upon those
over whose actions the said Court was intended as a controul.” 65 The
justices seem to have grasped this danger themselves, and asserted
their powers, or held them in check, according to the effect on their
court’s constitutional function.
Thus, for example, from the beginning of questions triggered by
Nandakumar’s confinement, Justice Impey expresses a concern that the
court not take steps that undermine what Professor Burset calls “the
appearance of impartiality.” 66 Apparently it was important that the
court’s control over the Company be exercised judicially, rather than
politically. This required the observable maintenance of a formal
separation between the court and council. In a subsequent letter, Impey
asserted on behalf of the entire court that the council lacked “any legal
authority . . . to review and control any judicial acts of the judges done
either in or out of court.” 67 The letter itself is an advisory opinion (of a
sort) and expressly defends the judges’ right to act independent of
council control “out of court.” The justiciability doctrine advanced here
is therefore not the inappropriateness of advisory opinions, but the
finality of judicial acts (in or out of court), as is conventionally
represented in American jurisprudence by Hayburn’s Case. 68 The final
letter in the affair returns to this theme of independence by finality and
the appearance of impartiality. The SCJ, wrote the judges, is “not in
general justifiable” by the council. Its decisions are final. Since,
however, the question now posed by the council could not come before
the court judicially, its independence was not at risk and it could
provide an opinion. 69
A resistance to giving advisory opinions clearly formed part of
these events, but a willingness to give those opinions ultimately
resolved the controversy over jurisdiction, and the firm ground to which
the court retreated was its independence. The subsequent crisis over
whether Warren Hastings or John Clavering was Governor-General
exhibits a similar logic. When asked to decide who was lawfully
governor, the court agreed to give its opinion only so long as it was
treated as mere advice, rather than a judgment (an opinion whose

65. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, THE STORY OF NUNCOMAR AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF SIR
ELIJAH IMPEY 6 (1885) (emphasis added). Professor Burset kindly directed me to this quotation.
66. Burset, supra note *, at 645.
67. Id., at 647.
68. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 51, at 81–94.
69. Burset, supra note *, at 647.
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weight derived “from the reasoning of it, not from its authority”). 70 The
court’s apparent worry was losing its independence, since a judgment
in favor of the Governor-General would imply some connection
between them.
It does seem right to conclude, as Professor Burset does, that an
uncertainty about the authority of advisory opinions exposed judges to
risk. 71 A politician might solicit judicial advice and use it to shift blame
for an unpopular decision to the judge. A judge might be accused of bias
in a subsequent case that raised a legal question on which he already
offered his opinion out of court. Should we explain the abandonment of
advisory opinions as an effort by judges to avoid these risks, in light of
an intellectual anxiety shared across the common-law world? Or should
we conclude that these risks became part of a complex practical
calculus, in which judges balanced worries about the misuse of advisory
opinions with institutional and political concerns that sometimes
pointed in a different direction? Sometimes judges simultaneously gave
advice and declared that they were not under an obligation to do so; and
sometimes they deliberately spoke out of court to defend what they
perceived to be institutional rights or prerogatives; and sometimes they
injected themselves into the midst of political controversy by using their
decisions in litigated cases, despite the personal and institutional risks
that doing so posed. These are some of the complexities that we must
consider as we move forward with the project of understanding our
federal judicial power from an imperial perspective.

70. Id., at 649.
71. Id., at 666–67.

